State of Utah v. Billy Cayer : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
State of Utah v. Billy Cayer : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dale Dorius; Attorney for Appellant.
Utah Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation









^o02^°V^ UTAH C0URT 0F APPEALS 
^TATE OF UTAH 




Case No, 900297-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the First District 
Court for Box Elder County, Honorable F.L. Gunnell, 
Judge. 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Dale Dorius 
Attorney for Appellant 
29 South Main St. 
Brigham City, Ut 84302 
Argument Classification 2 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 




Case No, 900297-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the First District 
Court for Box Elder County, Honorable F.L. Gunnell, 
Judge. 
Dale Dorius 
Attorney for Appellant 
29 South Main St. 
Brigham City, Ut 84302 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Argument Classification 2 
- - • * • • i " M > V 
i • • » • • . • - • • • • • . . . . . . * . . ' . ^ r s n i . »uo j 
_ iemiibJ .v 
• • - * * * ' i i. mi 11 f i i L i '. TPuiums 
C * • • • I" . 1 } ! | i j d l j : ) | ( ) ^ u a u i e ^ e q - S 
7 • • • * • « « • • • • s u n j S T A O f j «"IA r^PM r u u w ^ o 
I ; ;; l Fiiys J } i.i '4 UdUIQ^B^S 
X • • * • • " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s b u i p a a o o ; i ( l | j o o j m ^ e N 
T ' • ' " MI 11 "i.) i f.'. i i n r 
in • . ,. , j -| j JO( | ' . J .HV J u s» iqejj 
SM^lMOD " JO ' H'fTft¥J; 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Pages 
Chimel vs. California, 395 US 725 (1969) 23 L.Ed 685 (1969) 16 
Clark County vs. Potter, 663 P.2d 350 (Nevada, 1983) 24 
Coolidge vs. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971) 15 
Katz vs. United States, 389 US 347 (1967) 15 
State vs. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah, 1985) 22 
State vs. Bradford, 683 P.2d 924 (Montana, 1984) 24 
State vs. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah, 1984) 15 
State vs. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah, 1986) 20 
State vs. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981) 15 
State vs. Hickle,< 650 P.2d 1216 (Arizona, 1982) 24 
State vs. Ireland, 108 Ut, Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah, 1989) 22 
State vs. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah, 1989) 10-14 
State vs. Johansson, 680 P.2d 25 (Utah, 1984) 23 
State VS. Kalisz, 735 P.2ct 60 (Utah, 1987) 24 
State VS. Kent, 432 P.2d 64 (Utah, 1967) 16 
State vs. Laffertv, 749 P.,2d 1239 (Utah, 1988) 21 
State vs. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah, 1968) 20 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment 14 U.S. Constitution 14 
U.S. Constitution 4thAmendment 15 
Utah State Constitution Article I § 11 14 
Utah State Constitution Article I § 12. 2 6 
STATUTES 
U.C.A. § 76-2-202 24 
U.C.A. § 76-5-203 23 
RULES OF PROCEDURE 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure § 17 (i) .26 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure § 29 (e) (i) (ii) 10,11 
Utah Rules of Evidence § 401 19 
Utah Rules of Evidence § 4 03 19 
i i i 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah 
Court of Appeals Rules* 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the First District Court, Judge F.L. 
Gunnell as trial Judge. Judge F.L. Gunnell entered judgment based 
on jury verdict and committed Appellant to five years to life in 
the Utah State Prison on March 2, 1990. Appellant was convicted of 
second degree murder. Appellant appeals his conviction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 
refused Appellant's motion for a change of venue when Appellant was 
charged with involvement in a brutal beating death that received 
enormous newspaper and television publicity and when Appellant was 
from the South and had no family or other ties to Brigham City. 
Whether the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible 
error when it refused to suppress numerous items of blood-stained 
evidence which were seized in a warrantless and unconstitutional 
search and seizure of Appellant's living quarters. 
Whether the trial court erred in receiving prejudicial, 
inflammatory photographs and other evidence despite pretrial 
objections by way of a motion in limine to keep the jury from 
viewing such evidence. 
Whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain the jury's 
verdict of second degree murder where such verdict was based on 
Appellant's mere presence at the scene of the crime. 
Whether the trial court denied Appellant his constitutional 
right to assist in his own d€»fense when it refused to permit him to 
view the crime scene as part of his defense. 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
allow the jury -to view the crime scene in a situation where so much 
depended on the testimony of one or two eyewitnesses who viewed the 
events of the crime through an open trailer door in the darkness. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution; Amendment 4 
Utah Constitution; Article I; Section 11 
Utah Constitution; Article I; Section 12 
U.C.A. § 76-5-203 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 (i) 
Utah Rules of Evidence 403 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was originally charged along with three others in 
the beating death of Mike Ramirez. The three others were Donald 
Brown, Ray Cabututan, and William Cummins. Appellant was employed 
with these three individuals by Western Brine Shrimp. [T. 128, Vol 
I] 
Appellant is a newcomer to Utah and has lived most of his life 
in the South. He speaks with a distinct southern accent and has 
lived in Louisiana and Texas. [T. 106-107, T. 22, Vol I] He has 
no relatives in Brigham City where the trial was held. 
A number of employees including the four above-mentioned 
individuals and the victim of the crime, Mike Ramirez, were working 
at the Finger Point Camp of Western Brine Shrimp which is on the 
west side of the Great Salt Lake in Box Elder County. The camp was 
composed of four trailers in which the employees resided. [T. 125-
128, Vol I] The victim, Mike Ramirez, resided in a trailer along 
with Eddie Apodaca. [T. 126, Vol I] Ray Cabututan, William 
Cummins, Don Brown and Appellant Billy Cayer resided in another 
trailer. Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Sherman Gallardo 
resided in a third trailer. [T. 125, Vol I] The fourth trailer 
was reserved for a foreman who was periodically gone from the site. 
[T. 126, Vol I] He was gone from the site on the night of the 
crime. [T. 127, Vol I] 
On the night of October 25, 1989 a fight got started between 
Ray Cabututan and Eddie Apodaca. [T. 145, Vol I] Eddie was over 
at Cabututan's trailer. [T. 145, Vol I] Cabututan, Cummins, 
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Brown, and Cayer were sitting in the trailer consuming alcoholic 
beverages, [T. 141, Vol I] An argument ensued between Cabututan 
and Apodaca. [T. 14 4, Vol I] Cabututan struck Apodaca. [T. 14 5, 
Vol I] Apodaca got up and left this trailer. 
Apodaca returned to his trailer and started to explain what 
had happened to his roommate, Mike Ramirez. [T. 14 8, Vol I] 
Sometime afterwards, Brown, Cummins, Cabututan, and Cayer entered 
Apodaca and Ramirez's trailer. [T. 144, Vol I] Mike Ramirez 
jumped up and drew a knife on the four men. [T. 153, Vol I] 
Subsequently, Mike left the trailer with Cabututan, Brown and 
Cummins at this time. [T. 154, Vol I] Appellant Cayer remained 
inside the trailer at this time. [T. 156, Vol I] All of the 
evidence suggests Appellant Cayer was heavily intoxicated at this 
time. [T. 183, Vol I] Cayer apparently struck Mr. Apodaca several 
times during the next thirty minutes. [T. 156-157, Vol I] These 
two were the only individuals inside the trailer at that time. 
Outside, Apodaca claims he could hear noises of a beating taking 
place. [T. 155, Vol I] Little conversation appcirently occurred 
between Apodaca and the Appellant. 
After approximately 3 0 minutes, Appellant left the trailer and 
went outside. [T. 160, Vol I] It must be remembered that all of 
these events occurred outside in the dark at about 10:30 p.m. to 
midnight. [T. 36, Vol II] However, there is testimony that at one 
point Appellant Cayer was outside standing at the feet of Mike 
Ramirez's body. [T. 38, 39, Vol II] Appellant may have kicked 
Mike's feet with his shoe. [T. 69, Vol II] The evidence on these 
points is very slim. Cummins, Brown, and Cabututan were all 
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outside around Ramirezfs body. [T. 38, 39, Vol II] Richard 
Anderson appears to be the only person who testifies Cayer struck 
or kicked Ramirez. This identification was made through an open 
door in the dark. [T. 38, Vol II] 
The beating ended after about an hour. [T. 48, Vol II] 
About 5:00 a.m. the victim, Mike Ramirez, knocked on the door 
of Anderson's trailer. [T. 59, Vol II] Apparently, Ramirez was 
able to get up after the fight and drink a cup of water. [T. 60, 
Vol II] Ramirez spoke to Anderson briefly then fell over and 
died. [T. 60, Vol II] 
Shortly afterwards, Richard and Sherman Gallardo jumped in a 
truck and drove to Lakeside. [T. 60, Vol II] There they 
telephoned the Box Elder County Sheriff. [T. 62, Vol II] 
Officers T. Lynn Yates, Roger Olsen, Jim Summerill, and Dale 
Ward of the Box Elder County Sheriff's Office arrived at the camp 
between 8:00 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. [T. 247, Vol II; T.4, Vol III] 
They arrested Cummins, Brown, Cabututan, and Cayer. [T. 2 63, Vol 
II] Subsequently, the four were held in another trailer, while 
the deputies conducted a warrentless search of Appellant's trailer. 
[T. 266, Vol II] A number of items of evidence were seized 
including: white tennis shoes; hip waders; a blue Puma bag with 
contents; a pink bag with clothing and other items; a cardboard 
box; white folding knife; a bottle of Smirnoff Vodka; a bottle of 
Jack Daniels whiskey, a 10 inch crescent wrench. [T. 185-270, Vol 
II] 
Officer Ward took photographs of the crime scene which 
included photos of the victim1s body. [P-69, III. 13, P. 9, P. 64, 
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P-49]. [T. 4-32, Vol III] Numerous pictures of blood stained 
clothing articles, and pictures of bloody walls; tools and 
implements were taken as well. [T. 4-32, Vol III] 
Prior to the trial of this case, Appellant's counsel filed 
motions to change venue, suppress illegally seized evidence, 
exclude prejudicial evidence, and allow Appellant and the jury to 
view the crime scene. These motions were all denied. 
Appellant's first trial for murder ended in a "hung" or 
deadlocked jury, Appellant was tried foi* the offense of second 
degree murder next on February 26, 1990 in Brigham City. This time 
the jury convicted Appellant of Second Degree Murder. [T. 95, Vol 
III] 
Th€i Court entered judgment and sentenced Appellant to a term 
of 5 years to life in the Utah State Prison. [T. 98, Vol III] 
Appellant appeals this conviction and sentence. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant did not receive a fair trial in Brigham City because 
this was a violent crime, and Brigham City is a small community. 
Additionally, there was an unusually large amount of pretrial 
publicity surrounding this "Brine Shrimp Murder Case". Therefore, 
the trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion for a change of 
venue. 
The trial court erred in refusing to grant Appellant's motion 
to suppress. Most evidence in this case was seized pursuant to a 
warrantless and unjustified search and seizure of Appellant's 
trailer. No exigent circumstances justified the search. 
The trial court erred in refusing to exclude gruesome 
photographs and blood-stained objects from the trial as being 
unfairly prejudicial. 
Insufficient evidence existed to support a guilty verdict for 
second degree murder. None of Appellant's conduct met the criteria 
under the second degree murder statute. Additionally, mere 
presence at a crime scene does not make one guilty under a theory 
of accomplice liability. 
The court erred in not allowing the jury to view the crime 
scene. If it had, jurors would have better understood the weak and 
scanty nature of eyewitness identification made of Appellant. 
The court erred in not allowing Appellant to view the crime 
scene following his arrest. The Utah State Constitution guarantees 
Appellant the right to participate in his defense and this was 
erroneously taken from him. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANTfS MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Brigham City is the County seat of Box Elder County. The area 
is quite rural with a good deal of farming and ranching. According 
to the 1980 Census, Box Elder County has a population of 3 6,873 
people. This same census, Brigham City's population was 15,596. 
The community is quite closely knit. Juries from Box Elder County 
have something of a reputation for rendering conservative verdicts. 
This crime received a tremendous amount of publicity. 
Appellant initially filed a Motion for a Change of Venue with the 
Court on February 21, 1990. Appellant had two trials. The jury 
was unable to reach a verdict at the first trial and deadlocked. 
A second trial was held on February 26, 1990. At this time the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty to a charge of second degree 
murder. While this was going on newpapers and television stations 
had a virtual "field day". This killing was repeatedly referred to 
as the "Brine Shrimp Murder". This jargon was used again and again 
by all of the local media. Appellant and three others were all 
charged and convicted after jury trials of the homicide. Every 
trial received considerable publicity. 
The media continually played on the fact that this trial 
involved a beating death. A beating death is more shocking than a 
shooting or a stabbing. Scenes of horror were continuously 
conjured up in the minds of all of the public who heard the 
unending barrage of publicity concerning the case from its start to 
finish. In fact, the trial Judge acknowledged the voluminous 
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publicity that this case generated in his opening remarks to the 
jury. [See T. 29, Vol I] 
In February of 1990, when Appellant's counsel first filed an 
affidavit in support of the change of venue, large numbers of 
newspaper articles had been written about this case. Twenty-one 
stories had appeared in the Ogden Standard Examiner which has a 
circulation of 4800 in Box Elder County. Thirteen stories had 
appeared in the Box Elder News Journal. This has a circulation of 
5,189. The Tremonton Leader published a total of 9 news stories 
about the case at this time. Lengthy and voluminous television and 
radio broadcasts have occurred on all of the television stations 
which broadcast into this area as well. [ See R. 343-387] 
Appellant is not from this area. He grew up in the South and 
has spent most of his life in the state of Louisiana. His name, 
accent, and other personal characteristics quickly tell native 
Utahns that he is not from this area. 
Appellant's counsel voirdired jury members concerning whether 
jurors had heard much publicity concerning this case. Mrs. 
Cordova, Mr. Wells, Mr. Harlow, Mrs. Penttila, Ms. Hanks, Mr. 
Davis, Mr. Rex, Ms. Corsi, Ms. Beede, Mr. Olsen, Ms. Stimpson, who 
were on the initial jury panel during the second trial all had 
heard something about this case before it came to trial. [T. 60-67, 
Vol I] 
It was in this climate, that Appellant was forced to stand 
trial for his alleged participation in a violent beating death in 
which four others participated. The circumstances were such that 
the Appellant simply could not receive a fair trial. This argument 
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was made to trial court. The trial court was given a full and fair 
opportunity to grant a change of venue and refused to do so. 
Subsequently, Appellant was convicted of the crime of second degree 
murder by the jury. 
In this instance both Utah State law and Constitutional 
support Appellant's claim for reversal based upon the trial court's 
refusal to grant a change of venue. The leading case on point 
supporting Appellant's argument is State vs. James, 767 P. 2d 549 
(Utah, 1989). Mr. James was charged with the murder of his infant 
son. The crime was committed in Cache County. Here, the 
defendant, Mr. James, moved for a change of venue on the basis that 
pretrial publicity and comment made it impossible for him to 
receive a fair trial on a charge of murder, The trial court 
rejected this contention and refused to grant a change of venue. 
Defendant took an interlocutory appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Court considered the case and reversed the decision of the 
trial court denying a change of venue. 
The court's reasoning in the case was based on a reading of 
the rule of criminal procedure that provides for change of venue 
and upon a four-prong test. Appellant will recite the rule of 
procedure concerning venue then undertake careful analysis of how 
this case relates to the four-prong test will be given. Rule 29(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: 
(i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal ac-
tion believes that a fair and impartial trial cannot be 
had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, 
either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting 
forth the facts, ask to have the trial of the case trans-
ferred to another jurisdiction. 
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(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representations 
made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of 
the case, the court shall enter an order for the removal 
of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free 
from the objection and all records pertaining to the case 
shall be transferred forthwith to the court in the other 
county. If the court is not satisfied that the represen-
tations so made justify transfer of the case, the court 
shall either enter an order denying the transfer or order 
a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and re-
ceive further evidence with respect to the alleged pre-
judice. [Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e) (ii)]. 
The operative phrase here appears to be "if the court is 
satisfied". This phrase is clear indication that the intent of the 
rule was to give the trial court discretion over the issue of 
venue. It is Appellant's contention that the trial court abused 
its discretion in this instance by not transfering venue to another 
county. Appellant reaches this conclusion by a review of the four-
prong test established by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. James, 
supra, as applied to the facts of the case at bar. 
The first prong of the test set forth by the court in 
determining whether excessive pretrial publicity may dictate a 
change of venue is the standing of the accused and the victim in 
the community. In State vs. James, supra, the Defendant was a 
newcomer to Logan and to the Cache Valley. There was testimony 
that he had used drugs shortly before the child's disappearance. 
The victim was a child. 
In the case at bar, Appellant was from the South and was 
essentially a native of Louisiana. He had lived in Texas as well. 
His name, accent, and other factors communicated he was not a 
native of Utah. Appellant was a transient laborer working at a low 
wage job at a brine shrimp camp located on the western shore of the 
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Great Salt Lake far from any town of significant population. 
Appellant had never lived in Brigham City and had no family in 
either the Brigham City or Box Elder County area. There was 
testimony at the trial that Appellant had consumed quantities of 
alcoholic beverages prior to the alleged crime. In Utah 
(particularly in small towns) predominant religious attitudes are 
highly negative or prejudicial to those who use or consume 
alcoholic beverages in any quantity. The victim in this crime was 
also a transient laborer. However, the cii^cumstances of his death 
(a beating by multiple individuals) created ci grave climate of 
prejudice. Therefore, the standing of the accused and the victim 
definitely dictated in favor of a change of venue. 
The size of the community was the second prong of the test 
that the court relied upon in determining whether pretrial 
publicity may dictate a change of venue. In State v. James, supra, 
the court noted that Logan had a population of 28,880 and that 
Cache County had a population of 69,200. The court further noted 
that the smaller a community, the greater need there will be for a 
change of venue when a heinous crime has been committed. 
In the case at bar, the crime was committed in Box Elder 
County which had a smaller population than Cache County. This 
population was 36,873 according to the 1980 Census. The case was 
tried (twice) in Brigham City where the population is smaller than 
Logan. This population was 15,596 according to the 1980 Census. 
Therefore, the size of the community definitely dictated in favor 
of a change of venue. 
The nature and gravity of the offense was the third prong of 
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the test the court relied upon in considering whether a change of 
venue was essential. In State vs. James, supra, the defendant was 
accused of murdering an infant. This was potentially a capital 
offense. Defendant was finally sentenced to life in prison. 
In the case at bar, the Appellant was charged in a violent 
beating death in which multiple parties allegedly stood around and 
beat another transient laborer to death over a sustained period of 
time. Evidence showed that the victim probably screamed and 
hollered during much of the beating. Other evidence produced 
during the trial including boots and other clothing covered with 
the victim's blood. Graphic photographs related to the beating 
were introduced as well. Appellant was convicted of second degree 
murder and sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The nature and the extent of the publicity was the final 
factor that the court weighed in State v. James, supra. The court 
mentioned the extensive number of newspaper articles, television 
stories, and radio news broadcasts concerning the case as 
constituting extensive publicity. 
In the case at bar, pretrial publicity was no less extensive. 
In Appellant's Motion for a Change of Venue no fewer than 4 3 
newspaper articles concerning this case and the connected ones are 
cited and enclosed. Television and radio publicity was equally 
extensive as it was in the James case. Appellant was tried twice 
for the crime of Second Degree Murder. The other defendants were 
tried as well. These cases generated enormously publicity. They 
were collectively referred to as the "Brine Shrimp Murder Case". 
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Appellant believes that it was impossible for him to receive 
a fair trial in this climate. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated 
that there are limits to what a jury can be expected to do* In 
State v. James, supra, the court stated: 
Although we do not doubt that twelve persons could be 
found who could honestly promise to set aside any pre-
judicial information which they had heard and any pre-
conceived notions which they had formed, there are 
limits to what should reasonably be asked and expected 
of prospective jurors who have been exposed to the 
events surrounding the alleged crime, [767 P.2d at 549] 
The United States and Utah Constitutions guarantee those 
accused of crimes "due process of law". [Amendment 14; U.S. 
Constitution].[Utah State Constitution; Article I; Section 11]. 
When th€i trial court refuses a change of venue in this type of 
circumstance, it denies an accused the right to have a fair trial. 
In this case, Appellant was denied a fair trial. 
Consequently, Appellant asks that this court reverse the 
conviction and the sentence in this case because the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing a change of venue and violated 
the Appellant!s constitutional rights to due process of law by 
denying him a fair trial. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED IN THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S 
LIVING QUARTERS. 
Appellant moved the trial court unsuccessfully to suppress 
evidence that was seized In an illegal and unlawful search of the 
trailer in which he was residing which occurred without a warrant. 
Specifically, Deputy Sheriffs from the Box Elder County Sheriff's 
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Office responded to an emergency call at the camp. When the 
deputies arrived, they entered a trailer in which Mr. Cayer and the 
other defendants in these cases resided. They thereupon seized a 
number of items including: white tennis shoes; hip waders; a blue 
puma bag and contents; pink bag with clothing and other items; a 
cardboard box; white folding knife; a bottle of Smirnoff Vodka; a 
bottle of Jack Daniels Whiskey; and a ten inch crescent wrench. 
Defendants were not asked whether they would consent to a 
search of the trailer in which all these items were seized. 
Defendants, and the Appellant did not and would not have consented 
to such a search without a warrant. 
Searches conducted without a warrant and outside of the 
judicial process are generally invalid and are illegal in the 
absent of a few rare circumstances. Katz v. United States, 389 US 
347 (1967). State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah, 1984). State 
v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah, 1981). Further, no amount of 
probable cause can justify a search absent exigent circumstances. 
Coolidcre v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants 
all citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures and states that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.[U.S. Constitution; Fourth Ammendment] 
A house trailer would appear to occupy the same status that an 
apartment building does. Tenants in apartment buildings certainly 
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have reasonable expectations of privacy in their belongings and 
possessions. The Utah Supreme Court has said as much in the case 
of State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64 (Utah, 1967). Here, defendant was 
living in the unit of a Salt Lake City motel. Police arrested him 
at the motel and conducted a warrantless search in which they found 
a quantity of narcotics. The police obtained the consent of the 
owner of the motel units prior to conducting the arrest and search. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court held that the consent of the owner 
of such facilities is not sufficient. Only an emergency such as a 
fire, riot, or escaping criminal suspect could justify a search 
without either the consent of the tenant or a warrant. 
Appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
trailer home because he lived there and kept his personal 
belongings and clothing inside. 
No exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless 
search and seizure. There was no means to move the house trailer 
anywhere. So it is not like an automobile. The housetrailer was 
not within the immediate control of the defendants. All of them 
were outside the trailer at the time of their arrest and before the 
search. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 725 (1969) 23 L.Ed 685 
(1969) 
The absence of exigent circumstances justifying the 
warrantless search and seizure is clear from the fact that the 
defendants were all detained in another trailer for approximately 
two hours before the search even began. It would not have been 
difficult for the deputy sheriffs involved in this arrest to have 
sent someone to the closest magistrate for a search warrant based 
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on probable cause. Even though the crime scene was located in 
rural Box Elder County, two of the sheriffs could have guarded the 
men while the third went to seek the search warrant. 
The trial court concluded during the hearing on Appellant's 
Motion to Suppress that the area of the trailer where the articles 
were seized was a "common area" that was utilized by other 
employees at the camp. Accordingly, the court held that there was 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in this area. Therefore, no 
warrant was required to search the area. The court also ruled 
exigent circumstances may have justified the search. [T. 118-123, 
Suppression Hearing on January 24, 1990] This reasoning is 
nonsense. This small house trailer constituted the entire living 
quarters for the four defendants in this case. Additionally, there 
is evidence that the defendants, including Appellant Cayer 
attempted to keep the area as private as possible by asking other 
employees to leave who entered it. [T. 104, Vol II] If this court 
upholds the trial court's decision, it will have said that those 
who live in a housetrailer in this kind of setting have no 
expectation of privacy in their dwelling area whatsoever. Such a 
result is inconsistent with both the letter and the intent of the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The search was also unreasonable because there was no need for 
the deputy sheriffs to search the inner contents of a blue puma bag 
and a pink sack which was done after this evidence was seized 
during the warrantless search of the trailer. Even if there was 
some far-fetched justification for the search and seizure of the 
other items, there was none for examining the contents of these 
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bags. Upon search, these* bags apparently contained items of 
clothing,. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a search 
of such bags without a warrant is an unlawful search and seizure. 
The court stated in United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
that: 
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or 
other personal property not immediately associated 
with the person or the arrestee to their exclusive 
control, and there is no longer any danger that the 
arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a 
weapon or destroy evidence, a search of the property 
is no longer an incident of arrest. 
Here the search was conducted more than an hour after 
federal agents gained exclusive control of footlocker 
and long after respondents were securely in custody; 
the search therefore cannot be viewed as incident to 
the arrest or as justified by any other exigency.[53 
L.Ed. 2d 551] 
Finally, the search was unreasonable because a day later the 
sheriffs returned to the trailer (without a warrant again) and 
seized a white folding knife as evidence. This, of course, was 
after the arrested men had been removed from the premises. As 
such, there was a complete lack of justification for the seizure of 
this item of evidence without a warrant as well. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AND ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED INFLAMMATORY AND 
PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND OTHER ITEMS TO BE ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
During the trial of this case, the trial court admitted into 
evidence a number of exhibits of evidence which were inflammatory 
and highly prejudicial to the Appellant. These exhibits included: 
photographs including the victim's body, blood stained clothing and 
other objects and weapons. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 401 provides that all relevant evidence 
is admissible in trials. However, Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
provides an exception to this rule for prejudicial evidence. Rule 
403 states as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
In the instant case, graphic photographs were presented 
showing the body of the deceased. Other evidence included blood-
stained clothing and photographs of blood-stained objects at the 
crime scene. In fact, there was so much of this material, the 
prosecutor referred to it as a "mountain of evidence". [T. 103, Vol 
I] Upon viewing this evidence, the court will understand what is 
meant. Appellantfs counsel made a pretrial motion in limine to 
keep these items out of evidence. This motion was denied by the 
trial court. 
In Utah, the courts determine whether evidence is unfairly 
prejudicial by conducting a balancing test. The court balances the 
probative value of the evidence against its potentially probative 
effect. If the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the potential 
probative value of the evidence, the trial court has the duty to 
exclude such photographs and material from evidence. 
In the instant case, there was no need to present these 
photographs and other blood-stained evidence. Eyewitnesses 
described the beating of the victim, Mr. Mike Ramirez for the jury. 
Additionally, Dr. Todd Gray, M.D., the Utah State Medical Examiner, 
appeared for the state as a witness and describe the location and 
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the number of wounds that Mr, Ramirez received. He also told the 
jury what he thought was the cause of the victim's death. Box 
Elder County Deputy Sheriff's testified concerning the location of 
the body and its condition when it was found. The only purpose 
that the photographs of the victim and other blood-stained evidence 
served in this case was to inflame the jury and make them angry at 
the Appellant. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reversed other criminal convictions 
where such photographs were received into evidence and the 
probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. In State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah, 1986), Defendant 
was convicted of second degree murder. During the trial of the 
case, the prosecution had introduced gruesome photographs of the 
body of the murder victim. Defendant's lawyer objected to the 
admission of these photographs because of their prejudicial and 
inflammatory quality. The Utah Supreme Court held that it was 
prejudicial error to admit these photographs into evidence. 
Accordingly, the court reversed Cloud's conviction. In its 
opinion, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Regardless of how the matter is viewed, the conclusion 
is inescapable that the photographs had no essential 
evidentiary value. All that they showed was 'put be-
fore the jury readily and accurately by other means 
not accompanied by ttie potential prejudice. ' Under 
these circumstances, we can only conclude that the 
photographs were proffered an used solely for the pur-
pose condemned in Poe I and in Wells—to inflame the 
jury. [722 P.2d at 753] 
The same result was reached earlier by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah, 1968). Here, the defendant 
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was charged and convicted of first degree murder. During the trial 
of this case, the prosecution introduced color slides of the 
victim's body into evidence. Defendant objected for reasons of the 
prejudicial quality of the evidence. Defendant appealed his 
conviction for this reason. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction. The court stated in its opinion that: 
Initially, it is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to determine whether the inflammatory nature of such 
slides is outweighed by their probative value with respect 
to a fact in issue. If the latter, they may be admitted 
even though gruesome. In the instant case, they had no 
probative value. All material facts which could conceiv-
ably have been adduced from a viewing of the slides had 
been established by uncontradicted lay and medical testi-
mony. The only purpose served was to inflame and arouse 
the jury. [441 P.2d at 515] 
In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court did not reverse the conviction. However, the court 
stated that it was error for the court to admit gruesome pictures 
of a murder victim. The court did not reverse because other 
evidence in the case was so overwhelming. However, the court did 
hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 
photographs into evidence. 
In the instant case, the court must find that the prejudicial 
effect of the photographs and other evidence outweighed any 
probative value. Evidence of the beating was presented by 
witnesses. Evidence of the injuries and cause of death was 
testified to by the Utah State Medical Examiner. Finally, evidence 
of the position of the position of the body was testified to by the 
deputy sheriffs. 
The court must also conclude that this error was harmful and 
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prejudicial to Appellant and must reverse his conviction. The 
error was prejudicial because the photographs and other evidence 
portrayed a particularly brutal beating death. Some photographs 
depicted the body of the victim. After viewing all the photographs 
and clothing, it does not take much imagination to see why 
Appellant could not get a fair trial, 
THE CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a verdict of second degree murder. Briefly, the facts in 
this case were that Appellant was heavily intoxicated the night 
that the beating occurred. There was testimony that while most of 
the beating was occurring, Appellant was inside another trailer 
awkwardly swinging his fists at an individual named Mike Apodaca. 
Two witnesses testified that by peering through the windows of 
their house trailer into the dark night that they could see 
Appellant Cayer at the feet of Mike Ramirez, the victim. No one 
could testify that Appellant did anything more than kick at Mr. 
Ramiress's feet. 
Any claim that a verdict is unsupported by substantial 
evidence undergoes a rigid standard of review by the Court of 
Appeals. This standard is set forth in State v. Ireland, 108 Ut. 
Adv. Rpt. 3 (Utah, 1989). Here, the court stated that: 
This court will overturn a jury verdict only when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reas-
onable person could not have reached that verdict be-
yond a reasonable doubt. [108 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 5] 
See also State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah, 1985). State v. 
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Johansson, 680 P.2d 25 (Utah, 1984). Nevertheless, it is 
Appellant's contention that even under this rigid standard of 
review the jury's verdict is insupportable. 
The starting point for the analysis is the second degree 
murder statute. The second degree murder statute reads as follows: 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second de-
gree if the actor: 
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another; or (b) Intending to cause serious bodily in-
jury to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous 
to human life that causes the death of another; or 
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another 
and thereby causes the death of another; 
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of the 
first degree. [U.C.A. 76-5-203] 
A close review of the record reveals that there simply is no 
evidence which suggests that: (1) that Appellant intended to cause 
the death of Mike Ramirez; (2) that Appellant intended to cause 
serious bodily injury to Mike Ramirez; (3) that Appellant 
evidenced a depraved indifference to human life or recklessly 
engaged in conduct creating a grave risk of death to another. The 
most that the evidence shows is that Appellant hit another person, 
Mr. Apodaca with his fists. Second, that he kicked the victim's 
feet. This does not add up to intent to kill, intent to cause 
serious bodily injury, depraved indifference to human life, or 
reckless conduct creating a grave risk of death. This is the case 
even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
state. 
Nor was there sufficient evidence to justify conviction of 
Appellant for second degree murder under a theory of aiding or 
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encouraging the offense. The relevant section of Utah Law which 
deals with aiding and abetting is U.C.A. 76-2-202. This states 
that: 
Every person acting with the mental state required for 
the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, request, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aides another person to engcige in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
In the instant case, there is very slim evidence to suggest 
that Appellant aided or encouraged the murder of Mike Ramirez. The 
only evidence produced suggests that Appellant was highly 
intoxicated and got into a clumsy fist fight with Ed Apodaca on the 
night of the homicide. Clumsy indeed, because Mr. Apodaca believes 
he was struck two or three times over a period of approximately 
one-half an hour. Then, later spotty eyewitness identifications 
were made of Appellant standing at the feet of the victims body. 
It is settled law that mere presence at the scene of a crime 
is insufficient evidence to prove accomplice liability for a crime: 
State vs. Hicklef 650 P.2d 1216 (Arizona, 1982). State vs. Green, 
696 P.2d 1305 (Kansas, 1985). State vs. Bradford, 683 P.2d 924 
(Montana, 1984). Clark County vs. Potter, 663 P.2d 350 (Nevada, 
1983) . 
In State vs. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah, 1987), our Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction for aiding and 
abetting in so doing the court constured U.C.A. 76-2-202. In 
Kalisz, the Defendant had been convicted of the crime of robbery. 
Evidence presented at trial merely showed that Kalisz furnished 
transportation to a robbery. Our Utah Supreme Court reversed 
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Kalisz's conviction, holding that evidence presented was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction for this offense. 
In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to offer any 
evidence other than Appellant's fight with Ed Apodaca and his 
possible presence next to the presence of the victim (victim's feet 
at that). Therefore, this court must conclude as a matter of law 
that that insufficient evidence exists to convict Appellant of the 
crime of second degree murder. 
This necessitates a reversal of Appellant's conviction for 
second degree murder by this court. 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE 
APPELLANT WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW THE JURY TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE 
DURING THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a 
jury view of the crime scene. The court apparently denied this 
request because of the time and distance between the courthouse. 
However, such a view would have helped the jury to better 
understand the perceptual difficulties that the eyewitnesses in the 
case encountered. The crime took place near midnight in late 
October in a rural area. The only lighting was from trailer 
lights. Only one witness could state Appellant Cayer ever struck 
Mr. Mike Ramirez's body. This witness testified Mr. Cayer kicked 
at the victim's feet. Then this witness states he left the scene 
shortly afterward. 
With the verdict hinging on such weak evidence it cannot be 
said that a refusal to permit a jury view of the crime scene fell 
within the trial court's discretion. Rather, such a view would 
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have contributed greatly to the presentation of a defense based on 
inadequate eyewitness identification of Mr. Cayer. An appropriate 
ruling by this court would be to reverse Appellant's conviction on 
the ground that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
permitting a jury view of the crime scene under Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 17 (i). 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO RETURN TO 
THE CRIME SCENE TO ASSIST IN HIS DEFENSE. 
Appellant was unconstitutionally not permitted to return to 
the crime scene with his counsel as part of pretrial preparation. 
The Utah State Constitution provides that: 
In Criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by witnesses against him, to have compulsary 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behahf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. [Utah 
Constitution; Article I; Section 12] 
Appellant contends that he was denied his right to appear and 
defend by the refusal of the trial court to let him return to the 
crime scene to prepare his defense. Essentially, the evidence in 
this trial shows that AppeLlant was very intoxicated on the night 
the homicide occurred. The beating of the victim occurred in the 
dark of the night. Obviously, eyewitness testimony was quite 
critical in such a situation. If the Appellant had been allowed to 
visit the crime scene this could have served two purposes: 
1) It would have refreshed Appellant's memory concerning the 
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events of that evening. 
2) Appellant may have been able to refute some of the spotty 
eyewitness identification that was made in the dark. 
Under these circumstances the court should conclude that the 
trial judge committed prejudicial and reversible error by not 
allowing Appellant to return to the crime scene. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant did not receive a fair trial because he was forced 
to stand trial in a small community for a vicious crime which had 
received widespread newpaper, television, and radio publicity. The 
trial Court had an opportunity to grant a change of venue, but 
refused to do so. 
Unconsitutionally seized evidence was admitted as evidence 
during Appellant's trial. Such evidence had a prejudicial effect 
where the total evidence against Appellant was slim. Consequently, 
this mandates reversal of the conviction. 
Graphic photographs and blood-stained evidence which was 
unfairly prejudicial were received at Appellant's trial. Such 
evidence greatly contributed to the jury's verdict of guilty of 
second degree murder. Therefore, the conviction must be reversed. 
Insufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction 
for second degree murder. The law requires more than the presence 
of an individual at the scene of a crime to sustain his conviction 
for committing that crime. Therefore, Appellant's conviction must 
be reversed. 
The court abused its discretion when it refused to have the 
27 
jury visit the scene of the crime. The crux of this crime is 
supported by scant eyewitness testimony of events occurring in the 
dark of the night. A jury view of the scene would have emphasized 
this problem. Hence, the conviction and sentence must be reversed, 
Appellant's right to assist in his own defense was violated 
when he was not permitted to visit the scene of the crime. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of October, 1990. 
JWvio \ 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a ture and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Plaintiff/Respondentfs attorney, 
Office of the Attorney General, State of Utah, Governmental Affairs, 
Room 236, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 
9th day of October, 1990. 
DALlir-ft. DORIUS 
Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
Judgment and Commitment form for Appellant 
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ISTRU BWGHAMOl t tCT 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plai ntiff, 
vs, 
BILLY D. LAYER, 
De-Fendant, 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
CRIMINAL NO. B91000061 FS 
On the 28th day o-F February 1990, appeared Roger F. Baron, 
Deputy Box Elder County Attorney, representing the State o-F Utah, 
and the de-fendant appeared in person and represented by counsel, 
Dale M. Donas. 
It is ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted by a 
jury of the crime of: 
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE 
as changed in the information; and the Court having asked the 
defendant whether he has anything to say why judgment should not 
be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being 
shown or appearing to the court, IT IS ADJUDGED that the 
defendant is guilty as charged and convicted, 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is hereby committed 
to the Utah State P> ison and the Sheriff of Box Elder County is 




of the Utah State Prison to serve a term of NOT LESS THAN FIVE 
(5) YEARS TO LIFE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay restitution and 
costs as determined by the Utah Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole and/or the Utah State Beard of Pardons as follows: 
a. Ail attorneys fees paid by Box Elder County for assigned 
counsel fcr the defendant. 
b. Investigator fees specifically incurred by this 
defendant and 1/4 of the investigator fees attributable to any 
investigator services shared between this defendant and any 
codefendants to the extent the same were paid by EBox Elder 
U G u n t y . 
c. One Fourtn (1/4) of the costs of all transcripts 
prepared -for this defendant's case or the cases of the 
codefendants, to the extent the same were paid by Box Elder 
Ccunt y. 
d. Any and all restitution owing to the family of the 
victim, Miguel Ramirez, jointly and severally with the 
coaefendants, including but not limited to expenses for 
transportation of the body and burial of the body, and jointly 
end severally with the codefendants for any amounts paid by the 
State of Utah Office o-: Crime Victim Reparations. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the original of this Judgment anc 
Commitment Ehail be attested by the Cierl. of the Court and that c 
certified cop/ hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other 
qualified ot-ficer and that the copy serve as the Commitment o-f 
the de-fendant and as the Warrant -For the Sheri-F-f in taking into 
custody , Detaining and delivering said de-fendant. 






I he^eb^ certify that I mailed a true and correct copy o-f 
the ^.ecioinn JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT to Mi. Dale M. Donus, P.O, 
Bov U, E* ighap Citv, Utah 84302. postage pi epaid, this / ~*~ 
G d > C> jm &u*^_- ^^ 
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